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This paper explains market turbulence, such as the recent dot-com boom/bust
cycle, as equilibrium industry dynamics driven by the synergy between new and
existing technologies. When a major technological innovation arrives, a wave
of new ﬁrms implement the innovation and enter the market. However, if the
innovation complements existing technology, some new entrants later will be
forced out as more and more incumbent ﬁrms succeed in adopting the innova-
tion. It is argued that the diﬀusion of internet technology among traditional
brick-and-mortar ﬁrms was indeed the driving force behind the rise and fall of
dot-coms as well as the sustained growth of e-commerce. Systematic empirical
evidence from retail and banking industries supports the theoretical ﬁndings.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Technological innovation is one of the most fundamental impulses that set and keep
the market economy in motion. It incessantly transforms production and consumption
as well as organization of ﬁrms and industries, destroying old ones and creating new
ones — a process that Schumpeter named “creative destruction.” The recent internet
innovation and following dot-com boom/bust cycle has presented itself, although in
an unconventional sense, as a dramatic example of this process.
Internet technology became commercially available in the mid-1990s. Soon after,
the potential of electronic commerce was discovered. A huge wave of companies, so-
called “dot-coms,” were then formed to conduct business via the internet. A typical
dot-com ﬁrm is an internet pure play that operates only from its online website.
Its ability to reach customers in vast geographic regions via the internet, while not
having to invest in building physical facilities, has been among its most attractive
features for investors and entrepreneurs.1 During a short period in the late 1990s,
about 7,000-10,000 new substantial dot-com companies were established,2 most with
a vision of generating huge market values after taking the ﬁrm public. The boom
fueled tremendous excitement throughout the business world.
However, spring 2000 was a turning point. The dot-com stock index began to
fall and bottomed out mid-2001, when the dot-com exit rate hit its peak. The stock
index stabilized afterward, while dot-com exit continued, though at a decreasing
rate. Between spring 2000 and spring 2003, nearly 5,000 dot-com companies exited
1Although dot-com ﬁrms do not have to invest in physical stores, they may still have to invest
in storage facilities and warehouses. However, the costs of those are generally negligible compared
to operating many store fronts.
2Data Source: Webmergers.com, a San Francisco-based company that monitors the dot-com
mergers and acquisitions. Webmergers.com counts as “substantial” all dot-com companies that
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Figure 1: Internet Stock Index and Dot-com Death Toll
the market.3 From peak to bottom, the Dow Jones internet stock index4 plummeted
by 93 percent, and the Nasdaq composite lost 78 percent of its value. The Dow Jones
internet stock index and the number of dot-com shutdowns are plotted in Figure 1.
What can explain this striking boom/bust cycle of dot-coms? Several theories
address this question. Most of them appeal to ﬁnancial bubbles, rational or irrational
(Shiller (2000), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Ofek and Richardson (2003), LeRoy
(2004)). However, as Garber (2000) has persuasively argued, “[bubble] is a fuzzy
word ﬁlled with import but lacking a solid operational deﬁnition. Thus, one can make
whatever one wants of it.” More important, even if a bubble did exist, it still remains
3According to Webmergers.com, at least 3,892 dot-coms were sold and 962 closed or declared
bankruptcy.
4Dow Jones deﬁnes an internet stock as the stock of a company that generates more than 50
percent of its annual revenues directly from the internet. With 40 components, the Dow Jones







Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4



















Figure 2: U.S. Retail E-Commerce Sales as a Percent of Total Retail Sales
a puzzle what changes of real fundamentals, if any, could have induced the bubble to
form and burst in the ﬁrst place. Some other theories try to build more upon economic
foundations, especially the uncertainties in new markets; e.g., the uncertainties about
proﬁtability (Pastor and Veronesi (2006), Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode (2001)),
pre-production (Jovanovic (2004)) or potential market size (Barbarino and Jovanovic
(2005), Zeira (1999), Rob (1996)). Those factors certainly have played important roles
in the new economy, but some key issues still have been overlooked. In particular, the
nature of competition in the internet-related market has not been fully understood
and analyzed.
To illustrate this point, Figure 2 presents the time trend of U.S. retail e-commerce
sales as a percent of the total retail sales.5 It clearly shows the growth of e-commerce
5Data Source: The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce. Retail e-commerce sales
are estimated from the Monthly Retail Trade Survey (MRTS), where about 11,000 retail ﬁrms
are selected randomly. Their sales then are weighted and benchmarked to represent the complete
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Figure 3: Percentage of Online Retail Sales: Dot-coms vs. Multichannel Retailers
was strong and stable despite the dramatic shakeout of dot-com companies. What
drove this sustained growth? The evidence in Figure 3, showing the composition of
retail e-commerce through time,6 suggests the increasing online success of traditional
brick-and-mortar ﬁrms was a major driving force.7 Therefore, to better understand
t h er i s ea n df a l lo fd o t - c o m s ,w eh a v et ol o o ki n t ot h ed y n a m i cc o m p e t i t i o na m o n g
ﬁrms of diﬀerent types in the market — in particular, online pure plays verse traditional
brick-and-mortar ﬁrms.
universe of more than two million retail ﬁrms. The MRTS sample covers all retailers whether or
not they are engaged in e-commerce. Online travel services, ﬁnancial brokers and dealers, and
ticket sales agencies are not classiﬁed as retail and are not included. The estimates are adjusted for
seasonal variation and holiday and trading-day diﬀerences, but not for price changes.
6Data Source: The State of Online Retailing, an annual survey conducted by Shop.org, Boston
Consulting Group and Forrester Research.
7Improvement of internet technology and changes of consumer preference for e-commerce prob-
ably also played a role in the process.
51.2 A New Hypothesis
This paper proposes a new explanation as follows. When a major technological
innovation (e.g., the internet) arrives, a wave of new ﬁrms (e.g., dot-coms) enter the
market to compete with the incumbents (e.g., brick-and-mortar ﬁrms). This entry
is especially facilitated by the lower entry cost associated with the innovation (e.g.,
lower physical investment of dot-coms). However, if the technological innovation is
complementary to the existing technology, some new entrants later will be forced out
as more and more incumbent ﬁrms succeed in adopting the innovation (e.g., becoming
so-called “click-and-mortar” ﬁrms). During this process, the contribution of the new
technology to the total industry output (e.g., share of e-commerce in total commerce)
keeps rising, while the share of new pure-play entrants (e.g., dot-coms) keeps falling.
To formalize this idea, this paper develops an industry life cycle model based
on Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), in which forward-looking ﬁrms make optimal
decisions on entry, exit and technology adoption in a competitive market. However,
unlike Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), the new model allows the new entrants to
bypass the old technology and emphasizes the role sunk cost and technological com-
plementarity play in industrial evolution. Without assuming aggregate uncertainty,
this model generates mass entry and exit of dot-coms as the result of a complementary
technological innovation — the internet. Adding aggregate uncertainty to the model
does not change the main analysis, but it helps explain the timing and ﬁnancial losses
of the shakeout. Moreover, this paper considers explicitly each ﬁrm’s individual un-
certainty in adopting new technology, which explains the delayed adoption of the
internet among incumbent ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h eh i g hm a r k e t - t o - b o o kv a l u ef o rt h o s e
successful adopters (e.g., dot-coms and click-and-mortar ﬁrms).
The above theoretical ﬁndings are supported by systematic empirical evidence.
Exploring an original dataset of the top 400 e-retailers across 14 major retail cate-
gories, it is found that incumbent multi-channel retailers enjoy a substantial advan-
tage over dot-com entrants in both online and total sales. That advantage stems from
6t h es y n e r g yb e t w e e nt h eo n l i n ea n do ﬄi n ec h a n n e l sa sw e l la sm a n yf o r m so fc o m p l e -
mentary assets that incumbent ﬁrms possess. A similar pattern also is found in the
banking industry, in which incumbent multi-channel banks dominate the dot-coms.
The point that pure-play entrants are outrun by traditional ﬁrms who adopt new
technology is not speciﬁc to the internet. Similar synergistic advantages have been
observed in the diﬀusion of other technologies, for example, FM radio broadcasting.
During the late 1940s, business opportunities created by FM technology were aggres-
sively pursued by both new FM stations and the established AM stations diversifying
into FM broadcasting. The new playing ﬁeld then was dominated by the AM in-
cumbents who owned more than 90 percent of the FM stations by the early 1950s.8
The fact that AM stations embraced FM technology to take advantage of synergies
as well as to deter entry by independent FM stations is similar to the clash between
dot-coms and traditional ﬁrms adopting internet as a sales channel. Moreover, our
theory is consistent with the well-established empirical ﬁnding in industrial evolution
literature that incumbent ﬁrms in general possess substantial advantages over new
entrants and hence have a better chance to survive industry shakeouts.9
It is worth noting the diﬀerences between this paper and some existing game-
theoretical work that tries to explain how the nature of e-commerce technology af-
fects the entry and diversiﬁcation decisions of diﬀerent ﬁrm types. One example is
Dinlersoz and Pereira (2006), which studies the endogenous timing of adopting e-
commerce for traditional ﬁrms and dot-com entrants. Consistent with the ﬁndings in
this paper, they show consumers’ loyalty to the incumbent ﬁrm is a source of com-
plementarities (transferable reputation) that may give a traditional ﬁrm advantage
over a dot-com in adopting e-commerce. However, it is technically too diﬃcult for a
game-theoretical model to track industry dynamics, so Dinlersoz and Pereira (2006)
assume only one traditional ﬁrm and one dot-com can exist in the market. In con-
8Sterling and Kittross (2002) and Federal Communications Commission Annual Report.It h a n k
the referee for suggesting this example.
9See Klepper and Simons (2005) for studies on automobiles, televisions, tires and penicillin.
7trast, this paper assumes a competitive economy and de-emphasizes the richness of
the strategic approach in favor of a focus on the interplay between individual ﬁrm
decision making and aggregate industry characteristics. As a result, it provides a
more suitable framework to study the overall trends of industrial evolution.
1.3 Road Map
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, which studies com-
petitive industry dynamics generated by an exogenous technological innovation. In
particular, it shows that a shakeout of pure-play entrants tends to occur if the in-
novation complements the traditional technology. Section 3 applies the model to
the innovation of e-commerce, which features low entry costs and strong complemen-
tarity with traditional brick-and-mortar technology, to explain the mass entry and
exit of dot-coms. Empirical analysis on retail and banking industries supports our
theoretical ﬁndings. Section 4 oﬀers ﬁnal remarks.
2M o d e l
2.1 Background
The model is cast in discrete time and inﬁnite horizon. The environment is a compet-
itive market for a homogenous good. On the demand side, the behavior of consumers
is summarized by a time-invariant market demand curve D(P), which is continuous
and strictly declining.10 On the supply side, there is a continuum of ﬁrms with total
mass ﬁxed at unity. Each ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of its proﬁts.
At each time t,aﬁrm decides whether to stay in the industry. If it does, the
ﬁrm receives a proﬁt ﬂow that depends on the market price and its technology state.
10The model assumes there is one demand curve for the combined online and oﬄine market.
However, this assumption is not crucial. The analysis also holds for the alternative setting where
the online demand is separate from the oﬄine.
8Otherwise, it exits and gets an alternative return of πθ.Aﬁrm’s technology can be at
one of four states in the context of the internet economy. The ﬁrst is a primitive one,
θ, in which the ﬁrm cannot produce in the industry and thus earns zero net revenue
to participate. All ﬁrms are endowed with this technology. The second one, b, is the
traditional technology of production (b refers to the brick — brick-and-mortar). The
third one, c, is a technological innovation (c refers to the click — dot-com). The last
one, h, is a combination of the traditional technology and the innovation (h refers to
the hybrid — click-and-mortar).
Before innovation c arrives, only technology states θ and b are available. A ﬁrm can
either choose to stay out and earn πθ,o rp a yaﬁxed cost, Sb, to obtain technology b
to produce in the industry. After innovation c arrives, ﬁrms then have more options.
In particular, if a ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed cost, Sc, it may learn how to implement new
technology c, though the success is random and occurs with probability σ.11 As a
result, two new types of ﬁrms may appear in the industry in addition to the traditional
brick one. For example, if a type-θ ﬁrm succeeds in entering with technology c,i t
then becomes a click ﬁrm; if an incumbent brick ﬁrm succeeds in adopting the new
technology, it then becomes a hybrid ﬁrm. Therefore, driven by the technological
innovation and its diﬀusion, the market equilibrium gen e r a t e st i m ep a t h so fp r o d u c t
price Pt, industry output Qt a n de n t r ya n de x i to fe a c ht y p eo fﬁrm. These time
paths are thus the foci of our study.
2.2 Pre-Innovation Equilibrium
Firms are endowed with technology θ beforehand. The market for the homogenous
good then starts at time 0 when technology state b becomes available. Although all
ﬁr m sh a v et h eo p p o r t u n i t yt oc o n t i n u ee a r n i n gap r o ﬁt πθ from working somewhere
else, some of them may choose to enter this market. Those entrants pay a once-
11Alternatively, we may assume incumbent ﬁrms have a diﬀerent success rate σ than new entrants.
That allows the model to be more ﬂexible, but does not add much to the analysis.
9and-for-all ﬁxed cost Sb to implement technology b. The corresponding return is
ap r o ﬁt ﬂow of πb
t, which is a standard proﬁt function that depends on price Pt
and technology b; i.e., πb
t =m a x qb
t{Ptqb
t −Cb(qb
t)}, where Cb refers to the convex cost
function for technology b,a n dqb





For simplicity, technology b is assumed to be a standard practice that involves
no uncertainty to implement, and any future innovations such as technology c may
arrive at a probability too small to aﬀect a ﬁrm’s decision. Therefore, at each time
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t) is the maximum value of a ﬁrm with technology θ (b)a tt i m et,a n d
β is the discount factor.
The corresponding equilibrium is straightforward. Because of free entry, there



























where Nb is the number of brick ﬁr m si nt h i sm a r k e t .
Using Equations 3 and 4, we can solve for the equilibrium price P∗,t h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms Nb, an individual ﬁrm’s output qb as well as the market total output Q.I t
10implies a simple industry dynamic path: At time 0, ﬁrms decide whether to enter the
new market. Nb of them then pay a cost Sb to enter and stay there afterward. Since
it takes one period to transform the technology from state θ to b,n oﬁrm is able to
produce in the new market at time 0.F r o mt i m e1, the industry has a ﬁxed price P∗
and output Q = D(P∗)=Nbqb(P∗), and no further entry or exit will occur.
2.3 Post-Innovation Equilibrium
At time T,i n n o v a t i o nc arrives as an unexpected shock and triggers a market turbu-
lence. Now that ﬁrms have more options because of the technological progress, they
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Equations 5 to 8 say the following:
• A ﬁrm with primitive technology θ may choose to continue staying out of this
market or pay a ﬁxed cost Sb to enter with technology b, or pay a ﬁxed cost
Sc in hopes of entering with technology c (the probability of success is σ).I n
addition, it is possible for the ﬁrm to pay both costs, Sb and Sc, to implement
technologies b and c at the same time. By doing that, it may enter as a hybrid
ﬁrm if it succeeds in adopting innovation c (the probability is σ), or it may
become a traditional brick ﬁrm if it fails (the probability is 1 − σ).
11• A traditional brick ﬁrm has the option to work somewhere else, stay in the
market with technology b,o rp a yaﬁxed cost Sc to implement technology c.I f
it succeeds in adopting c (the probability is σ), it then transforms itself into a
hybrid ﬁr m ;i fi tf a i l s ,i ts t a y sa sabrick ﬁrm (the probability is 1 − σ).
• A click ﬁrm has the option to work somewhere else, stay in the market with
technology c,o rp a yaﬁxed cost Sb to implement technology b. If it invests Sb,
it then transforms itself into a hybrid ﬁrm.
• A hybrid ﬁrm does not have to invest in any new technology and can implement
whatever technology θ, b, c or h it wants to pursue the highest proﬁt.
Depending on the values of parameters, a number of equilibrium time paths can
result. To keep the discussion more focused, we assume the investment Sb is too
large for any type of ﬁrm to ﬁnd it proﬁtable from time T on. This condition is
likely to be satisﬁed in the dot-com context. Empirical evidence in section 3 shows
many brick-and-mortar ﬁrms have become major online players, while few dot-coms
have ever developed substantial oﬄine channels.12 Therefore, Equations 5 to 8 can
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As we will see, the equilibrium industry dynamics depend on how innovation c is
related to the traditional technology b.
12Some dot-coms did develop an oﬄine presence. For example, ING Direct, the largest dot-com
bank, opened four brick-and-mortar locations, referred to as cafes; RedEnvelope, a major dot-com
gift store, started catalog services. However, these types of oﬄine operations are typically limited
in scope and scale.
122.4 Characterization: A Complementary Innovation





t), the industry tends to experience a shakeout of new entrants. Still, we have to






t.L e t u s s t a r t
with the ﬁrst one.










t. Denote the mass of





The market equilibrium path can be characterized as follows.
At time T, given the entry cost Sc is suﬃciently small, Nθ type-θ ﬁrms attempt to

















Because Sc is suﬃciently small, the existing Nb brick ﬁrms also ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to adopt the new technology.13 S i n c ei tt a k e so n ep e r i o df o rt h ea d o p t i o nt ot a k e
eﬀect, there is no change in price and output at time T.
At time T +1, among all the Nθ entry attempts, a fraction σ turns out to succeed.
Hence there are nc
T+1 = σNθ click ﬁrms in the market. Also, as long as there are click
ﬁrms in the market, no brick ﬁrm will choose to exit since πb
t >π c
t ≥ πθ.A m o n ga l l
the Nb brick ﬁrms, a fraction σ succeeds in adopting technology c; hence, the number
of hybrid ﬁrm becomes nh
T+1 = σNb.T h e r e s t o f t h e brick ﬁrms will have to try
13In other words, the complementary gain from upgrading technology b to h needs to be large
enough. Here, we assume V h
t −V b
t >S c/(βσ) holds for all t ≥ T +1so that brick ﬁrms always ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to upgrade.
13upgrading in the next period. As the supply increases, the price falls, and no more
type-θ ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter.
After time T+1,a sm o r ea n dm o r ebrick ﬁrms succeed in adopting the innovation,
the output keeps rising and the price keeps falling. The price eventually reaches a
critical value Pc at time Tc so that click ﬁrms become indiﬀerent about staying or
exiting the market.
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D(Pc) − Nb(1 − σ)Tc−Tqb(Pc) − Nb[1 − (1 − σ)Tc−T]qh(Pc)
qc(Pc)
, (14)








For t>T c,a st h er e s tbrick ﬁrms continue adopting the innovation, more click




















Nbσ(1 − σ)t−(T+1)(qh(Pc) − qb(Pc))
qc(Pc)
. (16)
14In the long run, if nc
Tcqc(Pc) ≥ nb
Tc[qh(Pc) − qb(Pc)],n o ta l lclick ﬁrms will exit,
and the market will keep price at Pc and output at D(Pc). However, if nc
Tcqc(Pc) <
nb
Tc[qh(Pc)−qb(Pc)], then the market price will eventually fall again and the shakeout
of brick ﬁrms is also possible.
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t−T]q
h(Pt)}, (18)
and for t = Tc, Pt <P c for Pt that solves Equation 18.
Several further results can be derived from the model.
Proposition 1 The value of a successful click entrant increases from V θ+Sc at time
T to V θ + Sc
βσ at time T +1 , and then falls back to V θ at time Tc and afterward. 14
Proof. Given free entry, Equation 9 implies the value of a successful click entrant
increases from V θ+Sc at time T to V θ+ Sc
βσ at time T +1; given free exit, Equation 11
implies the value of a click ﬁrm equals V θ at time Tc and afterward. In the meantime,











which implies V c
t decreases in t.
14A successful click entrant enjoys an increase of market-to-book value initially; i.e., V c
T+1/(V θ +
Sc) > 1. This is due to survivor bias and consistent with empirical ﬁndings. Using Thomson
Venture Economics dataset, Hochberg et al. (2005) shows that for VC funds raised in 1998 and
1999, on average only 20 percent of a fund’s portfolio companies (presumably most were dot-coms)
had successfully exited via IPO or M&A as of November 2003. Using the same dataset, Gompers
et al. (2005) reports that for internet and computer companies that successfully went public, the
average Q value jumped to 6 in 2000, and fell to 2 in 2001 and to 1.5 in 2003.
15Proposition 2 Click ﬁrms start exiting at time Tc, but the number of exits continues
to fall after time Tc +1 .
Proof. Equation 16 implies xc
t decreases in t for t ≥ Tc +1 .
Furthermore, the share of output attributable to the innovation c continues to
increase from time T +1, but the contribution of pure-play entrants is falling. In the
context of the internet economy, it implies that e-commerce’s share in total output
is rising but dot-coms’ share in e-commerce is falling (recall Figure 2 and 3). To
illustrate this, we assume for a hybrid ﬁrm, the share ω of sales is conducted via the
online channel and counted as e-commerce sales.
Proposition 3 If ω is large, the share of output attributable to the innovation c
continues to increase from time T +1 , but the contribution of click ﬁr m si sf a l l i n g .
Proof. Denote s the share of output attributable to the innovation c and sc the
contribution of click ﬁrms. Hence,
st =1−







Assume ∂(qb/qh)/∂P > 0.I f ω>1 − (qb(Pc)/qh(Pc)), st increases in t and sc,t
decreases in t for t ≥ T +1 .15
In summary, Case 1 oﬀers the following ﬁndings, as illustrated in Figure 4.
• No click ﬁrm exits through time Tc − 1. The number of exits turns positive at
time Tc and falls after time Tc +1. Meanwhile, the total number of click ﬁrms
peaks from time T +1to Tc − 1 and falls afterward.
• The value of a successful click entrant increases from V θ + Sc at time T to
V θ + Sc
βσ at time T +1 ,a n dt h e nf a l l sb a c kt oV θ at time Tc and afterward.
15For example, if ∂(qb/qh)/∂P =0 , e.g., the cost function is Cx(q)=αxqβ (where x = h,b and
β>1), the condition for ω is simply ω>1 − (αh/αb)1/(β−1).
16Figure 4: Stock Value and Firm Exits: A Complementary Innovation
• Through time, as more ﬁrms adopt the innovation c, the industry output Qt
increases and price Pt decreases up to time Tc or possibly even afterward.
• The share of output attributable to the innovation c continues to increase from
time T +1 , but the contribution of click ﬁrms is falling.











t. Notice that the equilibrium industry dynamics
through time T +1are the same as in Case 1. At time T, Nθ type-θ ﬁrms, as well
as Nb existing brick ﬁrms, attempt to adopt innovation c, but the price and output
do not change. At time T +1 , σNθ click ﬁrms and σNb hybrid ﬁrms succeed in
implementing the new technology. As the supply increases, the price falls and no
more type-θ ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter.
17After time T +1 ,m o r ea n dm o r ebrick ﬁrms succeed in upgrading; hence, the
output keeps rising and the price keeps falling. The price will then reach a critical
value Pb so that πb(Pb)=πθ and some brick ﬁrms are no longer active in the market.
However, the remaining brick ﬁrms, active or inactive, may continue upgrading
their technology. Consequently, if the price eventually falls to the critical value Pc at
which πc(Pc)=πθ,click ﬁrms then start to exit (though it is also possible that the
price may not fall enough to ever induce exit by click ﬁrms).
2.5 Extensions
As discussed, the dot-com shakeout tends to occur if the hybrid is the most proﬁtable
business model, but the order of exits for click ﬁrms and brick ﬁrms may vary due
to their relative eﬃciency to each other. More generally, if ﬁrms are heterogenous in
eﬃciency within the click or brick group, it is even possible to see click ﬁrms and
brick ﬁrms exit at the same time. In contrast, if the internet innovation dominates




t), the dot-com shakeout would not occur
(see the Appendix for a detailed discussion).
Furthermore, what does the model say about the ﬁnancial losses incurred during
the dot-com shakeout? So far, assuming no aggregate uncertainty in the market, the
shakeout does not cause ﬁnancial losses to the overall dot-com sector.16 However,
it is plausible that some aggregate uncertainty exists. In fact, it took time for the
market participants to understand the competitive disadvantage of the online-only
business model. Therefore, aggregate ﬁnancial losses were likely to occur as the result
of overentry of dot-coms.
To see this, assume that ﬁr m sh a v et om a k et h e i rd e c i s i o n st oa d o p tt h ei n t e r n e t
innovation at time T based on their expected proﬁts: ET(πc) and ET(πh).I fex ante
16Notice some new entrants, who fail to adopt the innovation and exit, do have ﬁnancial losses.
However, that risk is idiosyncratic and can be insured; e.g., a dot-com investor may diversify her
investment portfolio across many entry attempts.
18Figure 5: Industry Dynamics: Actual vs. Counterfactual
t h em a r k e te x p e c t st h ei n n o v a t i o nt od o m i n a t et h eo l dt e c h n o l o g y ,t h i sm a yr e s u l ti n
overentry of dot-com ﬁrms (i.e., Nθ0 >N θ). When the truth is revealed ex post (at
time T +1 ), we then observe that all entrants suﬀer ﬁnancial losses.17 The industry
dynamics under imperfect information (actual paths) and perfect information (coun-
terfactual paths) are compared in Figure 5. Given overentry, the shakeout begins
earlier and becomes more severe than the counterfactual case.
To elaborate on this, we may use Nθ0,P0
t,Vc0
t ,Tc0,x c0
t for the corresponding nota-
tions under imperfect information. Notice that Nθ0(>N θ) is now exogenously given



















17Some other factors may also induce overentry; e.g., overestimating market demand or ﬁrst-mover
advantage, underestimating the learning rate of incumbent ﬁrms. However, the analyses would be
similar.
19which implies a lower price path: P0
t <P t. Because exit starts the ﬁrst time Tc0 when
P0
Tc0 <P c, the shakeout then begins earlier; i.e., Tc0 <T c. Meanwhile, all dot-coms





















In addition, the number of dot-com exits is larger. Equations 14 and 15 imply that























The above discussions suggest that in a market impacted by a signiﬁcant technological
innovation, the shakeout of new entrants tends to occur if the following conditions
are met: (1) the innovation creates some advantages for pure-play entrants (e.g., low
entry and/or operational costs); (2) the innovation is complementary to the existing
technology; and (3) it takes time for the innovation to diﬀuse among the incumbents
using traditional technology. The evolving history of e-commerce suggests that those
are indeed the features of doing business via the internet.
3.1 E-commerce Overview
In the early days of e-commerce, the market was excited about the potential com-
petitive advantages that internet ﬁrms had over traditional ﬁrms. By eliminating
physical operations, online pure plays enjoyed substantially low entry costs into the
20market. Internet ﬁrms also enjoyed further advantages, including: access to wider
markets; lower inventory costs; ability to bypass intermediaries; lower menu costs
enabling more rapid response to market changes; ease of bundling complementary
products; and ease of oﬀering 24/7 access.
However, eschewing physical space for cyberspace did not come without conse-
quences. Above all, online and oﬄine channels are not perfect substitutes. Internet
shopping ﬁts better with standardized goods and services, such as buying books,
which do not require personal contact with the item. Conversely, it is less suited
for “experience” goods and services, such as clothing, for which customers need ﬁrst-
hand experience with the item. Additionally, internet ﬁrms had to incur extra costs
by running high-tech systems that require a more expensive labor force, and also by
oﬀering more physical delivery channels.
Most important, traditional ﬁrms were entering the online business to explore
the synergy between the online and oﬄine channels. The sources of synergy include
common infrastructures, common operations, common marketing, and common cus-
tomers.18 The synergy also is embodied in the many forms of complementary assets
that incumbent ﬁrms possess, such as existing supplier and distributor relationships,
experience in the market, a customer base, and others that can enable them to take
better advantage of an innovation like e-commerce. Eventually, traditional ﬁrms were
able to capitalize on these synergies to beat the dot-coms at their own game.
18An example of a common infrastructure is when a ﬁrm relies on the same logistics system or
shares the same IT infrastructure for both online and oﬄine sales. An order processing system
shared between e-commerce and physical channels is a good example of a common operation. This
can enable, for example, improved tracking of customers’ movements between channels, in addition to
cost savings. E-commerce and physical channels also may share common marketing and sales assets,
such as a common product catalog, a experienced sales force, or advertisements and promotions.
Moreover, e-commerce and physical outlets in click-and-mortar ﬁrms often target the same potential
buyers. This enables a click-and-mortar ﬁrm to better meet customers’ needs for both convenience
and immediacy. For example, it can allow consumers to buy a product online and return it oﬄine, or
try a product in the store before purchasing it online. See Steinﬁeld (2002) for detailed discussions.
213.2 Hypotheses
Several implications of the model are empirically testable. The relative proﬁtability
of diﬀerent ﬁrm types is of particular importance and interest, and is the primary
focus of our following empirical analysis.
Other implications, such as the entry/exit patterns and the adoption sequence,
also are interesting.19 Although we do not formally test them, we nevertheless show
our theoretical predictions are largely consistent with the data throughout the pa-
per.20 Lieberman (2005) and Dinlersoz and Pereira (2006) provide additional evidence
on this for several retail sectors.
3.3 The Retail Industry
Retail is an industry that has widely adopted e-commerce, and multi-channel retailers
seem to enjoy advantages over dot-coms. According to Retail Forward’s annual study,
dot-coms comprised 23 of the top 50 e-retailers in 1999, but the number dropped to
11 in 2004 as reported by Internet Retailer. However, the evidence to date is largely
anecdotal, and counterexamples can easily be found. For example, the dot-com giant,
Amazon, has continued as the largest online retailer with sales of $6.9 billion in 2004.
This surpasses the online sales of the top multi-channels, including: Oﬃce Depot ($3.1
Billion); Sears ($1.7 Billion) or Walmart ($0.78 billion), and therefore, a systematic
19Note that website adoption by traditional ﬁrms may be a less accurate measure of their online
entry. In the theory, online entry is deﬁned as successful adoption of the internet technology.
Conceptually, it requires more than just starting an online business, but also doing so correctly. In
this sense, improvement and expansion of online services is indeed a crucial part of the entry process.
20The entry and exit of dot-coms are described in section 1.1. Systematic data on website adoption
by traditional retailers is not available but the adoption was certainly rising over time. Particularly,
right before and during the dot-com shakeout, major oﬄine retailers were busy launching or re-
launching (overhauling) their websites. As a result, they captured an increasing online market share
as shown in Figure 3. In section 3.4, more systematic data is presented for the banking industry,
which shows a similar pattern.
22empirical analysis is needed to fully address this issue.
3.3.1 Data
The empirical analysis uses an original dataset from two primary sources: Internet
Retailer and Compustat.W eb r i e ﬂy describe here the dataset and market deﬁnition.
The ﬁrst data source, Internet Retailer, identiﬁes the 400 largest online retailers
by their 2004 internet sales.21 It provides a comprehensive coverage of the online retail
universe: the top 400 e-retailers generated combined online sales of more than $51
billion and accounted for more than 90 percent of the total U.S. internet retail sales
(excluding motor vehicle sales, travel, ﬁnancial and ticket-related services) in 2004.22
Also, with additional help from the Internet Retailer, we are able to identify the type
of each retailer (dot-com vs. multi-channel) and even divide multi-channel retailers
further into traditional store retailers and traditional direct retailers (e.g., catalog
and mail order retailers). The second data source, Compustat, reports annual total
sales of publicly traded ﬁrms. It adds information of total sales (online plus oﬄine
sales) for 275 ﬁrms in the top 400 e-retailer list.
Following Internet Retailer’s deﬁnition, the 400 retailers are divided into 14 mer-
chandising categories based on their primary business: Beaut (Health/Beauty), Book
(Books/CD/DVDs), Cloth (Apparel/Accessories), Dept (Department Store/Mass Mer-
chant), Drug (Drug/Food), Elect (Computer/Electronics), Flow (Flowers/Gifts), Hard
(Hardware/Home Improvement), House (Housewares/Home Furnishings), Jewel (Jew-
elry), Oﬃ (Oﬃce Supplies), Spec (Specialty/Non-Apparel), Sport (Sporting Goods),
and Toys (Toys/Hobbies). We then test if multi-channel retailers have competitive
21Whenever possible, Internet Retailer obtained the data from the retail company. If the company
would not provide the data, Internet Retailer formed estimates based on other sources. Companies
were then given the opportunity to respond to the estimates.
22According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. internet retail sales totaled $69 billion in 2004, of
which about 20 percent were automobile sales via auto dealers’ websites. Online travel services,
ﬁnancial brokers and dealers, and ticket sales are not classiﬁed as retail and are not included.
23advantage over dot-coms in each retail category. Detailed data summary statistics
are provided in Appendix Table A1 and A2.
In the following analysis, we use sales data to compare ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. Within
a competitive framework, as assumed in the model, the sale/output/proﬁtc o m p a r -
isons are consistent. However, the comparison may become somewhat cloudy in a
non-competitive environment where price diﬀerences across retailers can play a role.
Empirical evidence suggests that price dispersion does exist in many internet retail
sectors (Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004)) and prices of internet pure-plays are of-
ten lower than prices of hybrids (Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2004)). Therefore,
our competitive model should be viewed as a ﬁrst-order approximation.23
The data of both online sales and total sales are based on 2004 information.
Ten years after the birth of internet retail and ﬁve years after the start of the dot-
com shakeout, the retail industry should have absorbed the technology shock of the
internet and evolved into a new steady state. Hence, this allows for a meaningful
comparison of market performance between ﬁrm types across retail categories. While
using solely 2004 information may have a selection bias since we only see the survivors
of the dot-com crash in the data, it in fact reinforces our argument regarding the multi-
channel ﬁrms’ advantage: Even the best pure-plays (i.e., survivors) cannot match the
performance of multi-channel retailers.
3.3.2 Multi-channel Retailers vs. Dot-coms
To identify the advantage of multi-channel retailers over dot-coms, we ﬁrst treat the
internet as a separate marketplace from the oﬄine. We then test the hypothesis that
multi-channel retailers enjoy greater online sales than dot-coms.
23Note that some retail sectors in the data have a small number of observations but that does
not necessarily mean those markets are not competitive. In fact, because ﬁrms are selected by their
ranking of online sales, many ﬁrms are not included in our sample.








γi ∗ CATEGORYi ∗ MULTI + μ, (R1)
where ln(WEBSALE) is the logarithm of online sales, CATEGORYi is the category
dummies (=1 if in category i; =0 otherwise), MULTI is the ﬁrm type dummy (=1 if
multi-channel; =0 if dot-com), and μ is the random error (likely being heteroskedas-
tic). The estimation results are reported in Appendix Table A3.24
The γi,b yd e ﬁnition, is the average additional online sales of a multi-channel
r e t a i l e ro v e rad o t - c o mi nc a t e g o r yi. The estimation results conﬁrm the multi-channel
ﬁrms’ advantage and also show that the advantage varies across retail categories.
Among all 14 categories, it is found that a multi-channel ﬁrm tends to sell more
online than a dot-com (γi > 0) in 10 categories, of which the advantage is statistically
signiﬁcant in 6 categories (i.e., the null hypothesis γi ≤ 0 is rejected based on a one-
sided t test). In the other four categories, a multi-channel ﬁrm tends to sell less
than a dot-com on average (γi < 0), but only in one category (Drug/Food) is the
diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., the null hypothesis γi ≥ 0 is rejected based on
ao n e - s i d e dt test).25
For the ten retail categories in which multi-channel ﬁrms are found to perform bet-
ter, the average diﬀerence of online sales between a multi-channel ﬁrm and a dot-com
ranges from 7 percent (Housewares/Home Furnishings) to 263 percent (Oﬃce Sup-
plies). We also notice that the four categories in which dot-coms are likely to do better
are Drug/Food, Department Store/Mass Merchant, Jewelry and Book/CD/DVDs.
One potential explanation is that products in these categories tend to be standard
goods and easy to transport. Therefore, the spillovers from the oﬄine channels to
24We also ran separate regressions by retail category and got consistent results.
25Statistical insigniﬁcance of some results may be driven by the small sample problem, but the
overall advantage of multi-channel retailers is clearly evident.
25the online channel (e.g., product display, customer consultation and distribution net-
works) are less important than other categories.
However, treating the internet as a separate marketplace is an extreme assump-
tion that may underestimate the performance of multi-channel retailers by ignoring
the spillovers from the online channel to the oﬄine channels. Therefore, we also ran
the above regression R1 using total sales (online plus oﬄine) as the dependent vari-
able, assuming that the online and oﬄine sales compete in the same marketplace.
This may be another extreme assumption, but at least we know the truth should
lie somewhere in between.26 The regression results are also reported in Appendix
Table A3, which clearly shows that multi-channel ﬁrms dominate dot-coms in every
retail category, and the advantage is so economically and statistically signiﬁcant that
there is no comparison. This result is consistent with our general intuition. Consider
Amazon and Walmart for example — the largest dot-com retailer versus the largest
multi-channel retailer. Amazon had $6.9 billion online and total sales in 2004, while
Walmart had $0.78 billion online sales but $285 billion total sales.27
Using market share instead of average sales per ﬁrm, Figure 9 in the Appendix
shows a consistent pattern. In the four categories where dot-coms have greater average
online sales per ﬁrm than multi-channel ﬁrms, dot-coms also get larger online market
shares (i.e., more than 50 percent). However, in the remaining ten categories, the
dot-coms’ online market shares are dominated by multi-channel ﬁrms. In terms of
total sales (online plus oﬄine), multi-channel ﬁrms dominate dot-coms in every retail
category (see Figure 10 in the Appendix).28
26Note that adding oﬄine sales to online sales for multi-channel retailers can never weaken our
ﬁndings, so it actually provides an upper-bound estimate of multi-channel retailers’ advantage.
27Amazon and Walmart are both in the Department Store/Mass Merchant category. Note that
Amazon is also the largest online book store. However, regardless which category Amazon is counted
in (Dept or Book), it does not change our empirical ﬁndings throughout the paper.
28In fact, dot-coms’ market shares in total sales are overestimated in Figure 10 because many
multichannel retailers’ total sales are not available to be included in the calculation.
263.3.3 Store Retailers, Direct Retailers vs. Dot-coms
So far, the multi-channel retailers are treated as a single group. However, the data
suggests some important diﬀerentiation within the multi-channel group. In partic-
ular, some multi-channel retailers, such as Walmart, specialize in store retailing,
while others focus on direct retailing (catalog/mail order, sales representative, or
telemarketing), such as L.L. Bean. Based on each company’s historical merchandis-
ing channels and primary business, we have identiﬁed 53 direct retailers out of 282
multi-channel retailers.
To see if diﬀerences exist in the online-oﬄine synergy between traditional store












βi ∗ CATEGORYi ∗ DIRECT + μ, (R2)
where ln(WEBSALE) and CATEGORY are deﬁned as before, and STORE and
DIRECT are dummies for ﬁrm type (STORE=1 if multi-channel store retailer, =0
otherwise; DIRECT=1 if multi-channel direct retailer, =0 otherwise). The regres-
sion results are shown in Appendix Table A4.29
The αi (βi),b yd e ﬁnition, is the average additional online sales of a multi-channel
store (direct) retailer over a dot-com in category i.W i t hs o m er e ﬁnement, the esti-
mation results conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings. Among all 14 categories, a store retailer
sells more online on average than a dot-com (αi > 0) in 8 categories, of which the
advantage is statistically signiﬁcant in 3 categories (i.e., the null hypothesis αi ≤ 0
is rejected based on a one-sided t test). A dot-com sells more online than a store
retailer (αi < 0) in the other 6 categories, but only the diﬀerence in the Drug/Food
29We also ran separate regressions by retail category and got consistent results.
27category is statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., the null hypothesis αi ≥ 0 is rejected based
on a one-sided t test). Among the 11 categories where observations are available, a
multi-channel direct retailer sells more online on average than a dot-com (βi > 0)i n
9 categories, of which the advantage is statistically signiﬁcant in 5 categories. More-
over, direct retailers are not found to be disadvantaged in the category of Drug/Food ,
but they are at a disadvantage in Oﬃce Supplies. On average, direct retailers appear
to enjoy a greater online advantage than store retailers. Among the 11 categories
where observations are available, direct retailers generate more online sales per ﬁrm
than store retailers (αi <β i) in 9 categories, and in 4 categories the advantage is
statistically signiﬁcant.
Running the regression R2 using total sales as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that
both traditional store and direct retailers dominate dot-coms in every retail category.
Moreover, store retailers are typically larger in total sales than direct retailers (αi >
βi) in all categories except Sporting Goods, and in ﬁve categories the advantage is
statistically signiﬁcant. The regression results are also shown in Appendix Table A4.
The above ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 6.30 Several results may need further
clariﬁcation. First, an individual direct retailer tends to sell more online than an
individual store retailer. It is reasonable to think that direct retailers may be able to
better adapt to the online technology, or their product lines are simply more suitable
for the online environment. Given the fact that direct retailers typically have smaller
total sales, they in general rely more on their online channels than the store retailers;
i.e., the ratio of online sales to total sales is higher for direct retailers. Second, the
greater online sales per ﬁrm does not necessarily mean that direct retailers have
contributed more to the dot-com shakeout than store retailers. Because the number
of direct retailers is small, less than one ﬁfth in the multi-channel group, their eﬀects
were rather limited. In fact, the cross-category pattern of multi-channel retailers’
advantage, in both online and total sales, is mainly driven by the store-retailers.
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Figure 6: Log Diﬀerence of Sales Per Firm: Store (Direct) Retailers Minus Dot-coms
Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix present the market shares in online and total
sales by each ﬁrm type, which clearly show the dominance of store retailers. Even
so, our study of direct retailers does remind us that the sources of multi-channel
synergy include not only the store channel, but also other oﬄine channels as well as
the broader assets that incumbents possess like brand, customer base and business
relations.
3.4 The Banking Industry
In addition to retail, the history of online banking provides further support for our
theory.
In the United States, internet banking started in 1995, when Wells Fargo became
the ﬁrst bank to oﬀer online access to account statements, and Security First Network
Bank became the ﬁrst online-only bank. The next few years were more or less an












































































Figure 7: Dot-com Banks: Stock Index and Death Toll
technology. Through 1998, 6 percent of national banks oﬀered transactional internet
services, and seven banks oﬀered online-only services. Then the diﬀusion of online
banking took oﬀ in 1999 and 2000. By the end of 2000, 37 percent of national banks
oﬀered transactional internet banking, and about 40 new dot-com banks had entered
the market.31 However, a shakeout started striking the dot-com banks in 2001. As
shown in Figure 7 (similar to Figure 1), the stock index for dot-com banks dropped
by 80 percent,32 and nearly half of the dot-com banks exited the industry by 2003.33
As suggested, the key to explaining the shakeout of dot-com banks is to compare
the competitive position of pure internet banks against their competitors with brick-
and-mortar branches. Similar to other e-commerce industries, the core strategy of
31Data Source: Online Banking Report and the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
32The stock index is calculated as the value-weighted sum of stock prices for six publicly owned
dot-com banks, which include Security First Network Bank (SFNB), Next Bank (NXCD), Net Bank
(NTBK), E*trade Bank (ET), USA Bancshares (USAB) and American Bank (AMBK).
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Figure 8: Evolution of Banking Service Delivery Channels
an internet-only banking model is to reduce overhead expenses by eliminating the
physical branch channel. However, it turns out the online channel is not a perfect
substitute for the branch channel, but a good complement. Figure 8 shows the number
of ATMs as well as brick-and-mortar oﬃces per bank has been increasing since the
mid-1990s, together with the increasing adoption of online banking.34
Exploring the synergy between online and oﬄine channels reveals that a click-and-
mortar bank typically delivers standardized, low-value-added transactions such as bill
payments, balance inquiries, account transfers and credit card lending through the
inexpensive internet channel, while delivering specialized, high-value-added transac-
tions such as small business lending, personal trust services and investment banking
through the more expensive branch channel. By providing more service options to
34Note: Institutions include all FDIC-Insured depository ﬁnancial institutions. Data on oﬃces
(headquarters and branches) is from Summary of Deposits;A T M sf r o mt h eATM&Debit News;a n d
transactional websites from Call Report and the OCC.
31its customers, a click-and-mortar bank is able to retain its most proﬁtable customers
and generate more revenue from cross-selling.
DeYoung (2005) compares the performance between internet-only full-service banks
and their branching counterparts from 1997 to 2001.35 The empirical results show
internet-only banks on average have lower asset returns than incumbent branching
banks as well as new branching entrants. This is primarily due to internet-only banks’
lower interest margins and fee income, lower levels of loan and deposit generation,
fewer business loans, and higher noninterest expense for equipment and skilled labor.
These results are robust after controlling the eﬀects of age and survivorship.
As more and more brick-and-mortar banks got online, the competitive pressure in
the online banking market surely increased. According to Call Report, 75 percent of all
depository institutions had adopted a website by 2004, compared with 35 percent in
1999. Meanwhile, 60 percent of the institutions reported websites with transactional
capability in 2004 compared with less than 37 percent in 2000.36 More importantly,
traditional banks outran the dot-coms in online services. Based on research conducted
by GomexPro, six dot-com banks ranked among the top ten for the “Best Online
Banking Services” in 1999, but the number dropped to two in 2001, then to one in
2003.37
35Besides dot-com banks, two comparison groups of banks are investigated. One is incumbent
branching banks, including 3,777 small, established banks and thrifts (with assets less than $1
billion that are at least 10 years old) in urban U.S. markets between 1997 and 2000. The other is
new branching entrants, including 644 branching banks and thrifts newly chartered during the same
sample period.
36Call Report started collecting website information for all FDIC-insured depository institutions
in 1999, but the information of transactional websites was not available until 2003. An independent
survey by the OCC reported 37 percent of national banks had adopted transactional websites by
2000. This suggests that the adoption of transactional websites by the overall banking population
should be even lower.
37The total score of online services is evaluated as a weighted sum of scores in categories of
functionality, ease of use, privacy/security and quality/availability, based on 150 to 300 criteria.
32Consequently, the online-only banks steadily lost ground to their multi-channel
competitors. As the Media Metrix online traﬃc data reveals, the number of unique
visitors to multi-channel banks’ websites climbed from 6.4 million in July 2000 to 13.4
million in July 2001 (a 110.5 percent increase), while the traﬃc to online-only banks
fell from 1.2 million to 1.1 million (an 8.1 percent decrease) during the same period.38
Meanwhile, the shakeout of online-only banks started in 2000, with the number of
dot-coms declining from around 50 in 2000 to fewer than 30 in 2003.
Security First Network Bank, the ﬁrst dot-com bank, was one of the casualties.
Acquired by Royal Bank of Canada in 1998, its internet operations were discontinued
in 2001. Other dot-com survivors generally have adjusted their strategies, trying to
avoid head-on competition with big click-and-mortars. For example, ING Direct,
the largest dot-com bank today, oﬀers limited banking services and encourages its
customers to keep their old bank accounts.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
This paper explains the recent dot-com boom/bust cycle as equilibrium industry
dynamics driven by the complementarities in the adoption of the internet technology
by traditional ﬁrms. Particularly, the dot-com shakeout occurred because the existing
technology and assets allow the incumbent ﬁr m st ot a k eg r e a t e ra d v a n t a g eo ft h e
internet innovation. In addition, we show that ex ante overestimation on dot-coms’
potential may help explain the timing and ﬁnancial losses of the shakeout.
With no externality involved, we can also show the competitive equilibrium is
socially optimal. It implies that as long as the social planner does not have better
information about the innovation than the market participants, there is no need for
government intervention. This may explain why the U.S. government authorities
38During the same period, the number of unique visitors to the internet rose from 76.9 million
to 92.2 million, a 19.8 percent increase, and the number of unique visitors to the overall banking
websites rose from 10.4 million to 18.5 million, a 77.6 percent increase.
33chose not to intervene during the dot-com market boom.
That pure-play entrants are outrun by traditional ﬁrms who adopt new technology
is not entirely speciﬁc to the internet. The analysis may shed light on other cases,
such as the diﬀusion of FM radio broadcasting, where synergies between existing and
new technologies are signiﬁcant. It also suggests a consistent explanation for the well-
established empirical ﬁnding in industrial evolution literature that incumbent ﬁrms
in general possess substantial advantages over new entrants and hence have a better
chance to survive industry shakeouts.
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Appendix: A Dominant Innovation





no shakeout occurs to the new entrants. It can be shown as follows:
At time T, ﬁrms attempt to adopt innovation c. Because πc
t >π h
t, hybrid is not
at all a proﬁtable model. Hence, all brick and type-θ ﬁrms, if they choose to adopt










37B e c a u s ei tt a k e so n ep e r i o df o rt h et e c h n o l o g yu p g r a d et ot a k ee ﬀect, there is no
change of price and output at time T.A t t i m e T +1 ,s o m eclick ﬁrms appear in
the market. As the supply increases, the price falls, and no more ﬁrms will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to adopt the innovation. Hence, starting at time T +1, no further entry or
exit will occur. Two possible equilibrium outcomes are discussed below.
The ﬁrst equilibrium, with πb(P∗) ≤ πθ,d o e sn o ta l l o wt h ebrick ﬁrms to remain
















which imply that among Nθ attempts for technology upgrading at time T (notice
that the Nθ attempts may include both type-θ and brick ﬁr m sb e c a u s et h e yh a v et h e
same opportunity cost πθ), σNθ ﬁrms succeed and produce at time T +1.T h e r e a f t e r ,
only click ﬁrms are in the market and there will be no further dynamics.
The analysis can be similarly applied to the other case. The second equilibrium,




















which imply that Nθ type-θ ﬁrms attempt to enter with technology c at time T (notice
that no brick ﬁrm would try adopting innovation c because of the higher opportunity
cost; i.e., πb(P∗) >π θ), and a fraction σ of them succeed at time T +1 .T h e r e a f t e r ,
σNθ click ﬁrms and Nb brick ﬁr m sa r ei nt h em a r k e ta n dt h e r ew i l lb en of u r t h e r
dynamics.
38Table A1. Summary Statistics: Online Retail Sales ($ million)
Category Firm Type Firm # Mean Sales Std. Dev. Min Sales Max Sales % of Sales  
Overall Dotcom 118 112.99 643.57 3.30 6921.12 26.06
Multi 282 134.11 407.61 3.81 3257.42 73.94
Total 400 127.88 488.42 3.30 6921.12 100.00
Beaut Dotcom 6 25.03 13.86 8.90 48.08 9.91
Multi 6 227.68 306.42 9.26 748.00 90.09
Total 12 126.36 232.30 8.90 748.00 100.00
Book Dotcom 11 79.01 146.14 4.65 506.23 51.12
Multi 14 59.36 115.03 4.60 419.80 48.88
Total 25 68.01 127.14 4.60 506.23 100.00
Cloth Dotcom 17 31.07 44.53 3.58 184.00 11.26
Multi 82 50.75 80.14 3.81 438.96 88.74
Total 99 47.37 75.42 3.58 438.96 100.00
Dept Dotcom 5 1568.95 2997.24 46.00 6921.12 55.41
Multi 16 394.61 468.62 7.63 1740.00 44.59
Total 21 674.22 1491.33 7.63 6921.12 100.00
Drug Dotcom 5 152.27 129.22 36.25 360.10 53.58
Multi 15 43.97 45.09 4.84 150.00 46.42
Total 20 71.04 85.60 4.84 360.10 100.00
Elect Dotcom 12 129.85 287.53 5.70 1000.00 10.93
Multi 20 635.03 934.65 11.40 3257.42 89.07
Total 32 445.59 791.51 5.70 3257.42 100.00
Flow Dotcom 7 42.33 46.55 4.00 128.80 31.87
Multi 9 70.36 106.71 4.56 307.47 68.13
Total 16 58.10 84.53 4.00 307.47 100.00
Hard Dotcom 3 26.29 18.60 11.00 47.00 16.36
Multi 7 57.60 65.77 4.40 163.68 83.64
Total 10 48.21 56.47 4.40 163.68 100.00
House Dotcom 15 24.47 19.45 4.22 68.70 20.36
Multi 33 43.51 88.81 4.80 477.50 79.64
Total 48 37.56 74.58 4.22 477.50 100.00
Jewel Dotcom 5 53.91 66.73 7.47 169.24 62.59
Multi 6 26.86 18.13 5.36 52.40 37.41
Total 11 39.15 46.31 5.36 169.24 100.00
Offi Dotcom 3 10.98 4.56 6.80 15.85 0.51
Multi 6 1061.84 1542.04 5.80 3100.00 99.49
Total 9 711.55 1327.50 5.80 3100.00 100.00
Spec Dotcom 19 21.64 19.12 3.30 69.70 23.96
Multi 28 46.59 48.04 5.47 172.81 76.04
Total 47 36.51 40.63 3.30 172.81 100.00
Sport Dotcom 7 15.42 13.54 3.91 39.60 10.81
Multi 27 32.98 45.46 4.02 200.18 89.19
Total 34 29.36 41.40 3.91 200.18 100.00
Toys Dotcom 3 19.08 16.57 8.00 38.13 8.87
Multi 13 45.26 103.12 5.06 386.00 91.13
Total 16 40.35 93.03 5.06 386.00 100.00
* Dotcom refers to online-only retailers; Multi refers to multichannel retailers who sell through both online and offline channels. 
39Table A2. Summary Statistics: Total Retail Sales ($ million)
Category Firm Type Firm # Mean Sales Std. Dev. Min Sales Max Sales % of Sales  
Overall Dotcom 118 112.99 643.57 3.30 6921.12 0.95
Multi 157 8881.93 26157.75 55.83 285200.00 99.05
Total 275 5119.26 20214.92 3.30 285200.00 100.00
Beaut Dotcom 6 25.03 13.86 8.90 48.08 1.00
Multi 4 3713.02 3637.76 211.68 7750.00 99.00
Total 10 1500.23 2835.17 8.90 7750.00 100.00
Book Dotcom 11 79.01 146.14 4.65 506.23 1.76
Multi 7 6938.58 8001.81 266.72 22525.90 98.24
Total 18 2746.62 5869.53 4.65 22525.90 100.00
Cloth Dotcom 17 31.07 44.53 3.58 184.00 0.42
Multi 51 2437.35 3657.40 200.00 19566.00 99.58
Total 68 1835.78 3329.40 3.58 19566.00 100.00
Dept Dotcom 5 1568.95 2997.24 46.00 6921.12 1.52
Multi 15 33951.70 71268.26 649.00 285200.00 98.48
Total 20 25856.01 62860.18 46.00 285200.00 100.00
Drug Dotcom 5 152.27 129.22 36.25 360.10 0.41
Multi 10 18696.05 17625.36 360.00 39897.00 99.59
Total 15 12514.79 16780.48 36.25 39897.00 100.00
Elect Dotcom 12 129.85 287.53 5.70 1000.00 0.57
Multi 15 18012.44 26927.59 100.00 79905.00 99.43
Total 27 10064.62 21736.32 5.70 79905.00 100.00
Flow Dotcom 7 42.33 46.55 4.00 128.80 4.65
Multi 5 1215.42 1829.73 55.83 4466.00 95.35
Total 12 531.11 1258.37 4.00 4466.00 100.00
Hard Dotcom 3 26.29 18.60 11.00 47.00 0.07
Multi 3 36768.00 36172.98 750.00 73094.00 99.93
Total 6 18397.14 30469.33 11.00 73094.00 100.00
House Dotcom 15 24.47 19.45 4.22 68.70 1.86
Multi 13 1491.03 1429.58 187.44 5150.00 98.14
Total 28 705.37 1209.66 4.22 5150.00 100.00
Jewel Dotcom 5 53.91 66.73 7.47 169.24 5.64
Multi 2 2254.64 70.43 2204.83 2304.44 94.36
Total 7 682.69 1075.61 7.47 2304.44 100.00
Offi Dotcom 3 10.98 4.56 6.80 15.85 0.08
Multi 4 10398.50 6766.94 275.43 14448.38 99.92
Total 7 5946.71 7329.70 6.80 14448.38 100.00
Spec Dotcom 19 21.64 19.12 3.30 69.70 1.48
Multi 12 2274.48 2649.48 186.35 8666.00 98.52
Total 31 893.71 1954.07 3.30 8666.00 100.00
Sport Dotcom 7 15.42 13.54 3.91 39.60 1.11
Multi 8 1205.63 840.97 233.00 2435.86 98.89
Total 15 650.20 855.25 3.91 2435.86 100.00
Toys Dotcom 3 19.08 16.57 8.00 38.13 0.27
Multi 8 2688.31 3550.24 301.66 11100.00 99.73
Total 11 1960.34 3221.41 8.00 11100.00 100.00
   * Dotcom refers to online-only retailers; Multi refers to multichannel retailers who sell through both online and offline channels. 
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   Category          Online Sales            Total Sales 
    
 
Beaut  1.18* 4.41*** 
  [0.76] [0.80] 
 
Book  -0.32 4.61*** 
  [0.54] [0.74] 
 
Cloth  0.41* 4.46*** 
  [0.32] [0.33] 
 
Dept  -0.78 3.46*** 
  [0.91] [0.92] 
 
Drug  -1.49*** 4.14*** 
  [0.48] [0.70] 
 
Elect  1.89*** 5.04*** 
  [0.60] [0.70] 
 
Flow  0.09 3.17*** 
  [0.72] [0.83] 
 
Hard  0.07 6.35*** 
  [0.67] [1.28] 
 
House  0.12 4.05*** 
  [0.31] [0.37] 
 
Jewel  -0.36 4.32*** 
  [0.60] [0.51] 
 
Offi  2.63*** 6.21*** 
  [1.04] [0.92] 
 
Spec  0.65** 4.32*** 
  [0.29] [0.44] 
 
Sport  0.48* 4.40*** 
  [0.38] [0.45] 
 
Toys  0.13 4.58*** 
  [0.52] [0.58] 
    
Observations  400   275 
Adjusted R
2                  0.23                   0.76 
 
 
Robust Standard Errors in the brackets;  
 
One-sided t test significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
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      Table A4.             Multichannel Effects: α (Store Retailer) and β (Direct Retailer) 
 
 
 Category  Online Sales         Total Sales 
            
  α  β  α-β    α  β  α-β 
           
 
Beaut  0.62      2.31***   -1.69*       4.75***     4.07***  0.68 
  [0.96] [0.59]  [1.08]    [0.68] [1.39]  [1.52] 
 
Book  -0.32  N/A  N/A       4.61***  N/A  N/A 
  [0.55]     [0.75]    
 
Cloth  0.14     1.54***     -1.40***       4.60***     4.00***    0.61** 
  [0.32] [0.41]  [0.32]    [0.34] [0.44]  [0.36] 
 
Dept  -0.76  -0.82  0.05       4.14***    2.10**     2.04*** 
  [1.00] [0.99]  [0.81]    [0.94] [0.93]  [0.61] 
 
Drug     -1.62***  0.29     -1.91***       4.20***     3.57***  0.63 
  [0.48] [0.38]  [0.29]    [0.77] [0.39]  [0.66] 
 
Elect    1.78***     2.50***  -0.72       5.35***     3.78***  1.57* 
  [0.64] [0.81]  [0.79]    [0.77] [0.98]  [1.05] 
 
Flow  -0.18  0.61  -0.79       3.85***    2.16**  1.69* 
  [0.79] [1.08]  [1.12]    [0.85] [1.05]  [1.13] 
 
Hard  -0.07  0.42  -0.49       7.76***     3.53***     4.23*** 
  [0.81] [0.89]  [1.09]    [0.45] [0.37]  [0.26] 
 
House  0.01  0.54  -0.53       4.19***     3.60***  0.58 
  [0.32] [0.52]  [0.51]    [0.41] [0.45]  [0.50] 
 
Jewel  -0.37  N/A  N/A       4.32***  N/A  N/A 
  [0.61]     [0.52]    
 
Offi     3.27***     -0.58***     3.85***       6.21***  N/A  N/A 
  [1.02] [0.21]  [0.99]    [0.94]    
 
Spec   0.44*     1.27***   -0.82*       4.39***     4.20***  0.19 
  [0.29] [0.53]  [0.52]    [0.49] [0.82]  [0.95] 
 
Sport  0.34   1.11*  -0.77       4.28***     4.60***  -0.32 
  [0.38] [0.69]  [0.64]    [0.57] [0.47]  [0.57] 
 
Toys  0.13  N/A  N/A       4.58***  N/A  N/A 
  [0.52]     [0.59]    
             
Observations  400            275 
Adjusted R
2  0.28            0.78 
 
Robust Standard Errors in the brackets;  
 
One-sided t test significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; 
 
























































Figure 10: Market Shares in Total Sales (Online and Oﬄine)
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